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The Monroe Doctrine in the 1980's: International
Law, Unilateral Policy, or Atavistic Anachronism?
by David D. Carto*
With the movements in this hemisphere we are of necessity more imme-
diately connected .... The political system of the [European] powers is
essentially different ... from that of America .... [W]e should con-
sider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of
this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety.
President James Monroe - December 2, 18231
On this side of the Atlantic we must stand together for the integrity of
our hemisphere for the inviolability of its nations, for its defense against
imported terrorism, and the right of all our citizens to be free from the
provocations triggered from outside our sphere for malevolent purposes.
President Ronald Reagan - March 11, 1981'
In the century and a half since the Monroe Doctrine was first pro-
nounced, it has been maligned, misinterpreted, and misunderstood as
often as it has been invoked. If its viability today were to be measured by
the number of times U.S. policy-makers had invoked it by name in the
last 20 years, the Monroe Doctrine would certainly be declared dead. The
simple reason for the reluctance of those sensitive to Latin American sen-
sibilities to mention the Monroe Doctrine is that history has cast an unfa-
vorable light on it from a Latin American point of view. One writer has
observed that while the United States has historically perceived the Doc-
trine of 1823 as a safeguard against European intervention in the Western
Hemisphere, to Latin Americans "the Monroe Doctrine is a hypocritical
statement calculated to conceal the intent of subjugation, which to them
has characterized the attitude of the United States in the past."s
* Case Western Reserve University School of Law, J.D. candidate 1981.
1 Annual Message to Congress, AM. STATE PAPERS, 5 FOREIGN RELATIONS 250 (Dec. 2,
1823), reprinted in 6 J.B. MooRE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 401 (1906) [hereinafter
cited as Monroe Message].
2 Address Before a Joint Session of the Canadian Parliament (Mar. 11, 1981), 17
WEEKLY COMP. PRE S. Docs. 276, 282 (Mar. 16, 1981).
3 Sarabia, United States Relations with Latin America, 51 A.B.A. J. 337, 338-39
(1965). William F. Buckley observed recently that until its "relegitimazation" by President
Reagan in El Salvador, "the Monroe Doctrine had become, since the October, 1962, Cuban
missile crisis, a fugitive term, used only with some embarrasment by historians required to
teach atavistic United States diplomacy." Buckley, Remember the Monroe Doctrine?, News-
day (L.I.), Mar. 14, 1981, at 17, col. 4.
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Despite the conflicting perceptions induced by the rare mention of
the Monroe Doctrine, its principles and reasons for existence have sur-
vived into the 1980's. Far from being an atavistic anachronism, the Doc-
trine is still a basic thread in U.S. foreign policy as a unilateral safeguard
of American interests in Latin America. In addition, as concluded by two
highly respected Latin American scholars over a decade ago," the Doc-
trine has, to a more limited extent, remained the multilateral policy of
the Organization of American States (OAS). Moreover, as this note will
illustrate, the principles of 1823 have found their way into the framework
of international law in the Western Hemisphere. Since the Monroe Doc-
trine is itself neither a treaty nor a contract between the United States
and other nations, its meaning as a principle in international relations is
derived largely from its historical origins, interpretations, and applica-
tions. Knowledge of the historical background of the Doctrine is therefore
essential to understanding its political and legal significance in modern
international relations.'
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE DOCTRINE
A. Monroe's Proclamation
The Monroe Doctrine was announced by President James Monroe in
a message to Congress on December 2, 1823.6 It was actually stated in two
separate passages in the message, each passage declaring a distinct princi-
ple in different contexts. These principles are commonly known as the
"non-colonization principle" and the "non-intervention principle."
The pronouncement of the non-colonization principle arose in the
immediate context of the border controversy surrounding the Oregon
Territory in 1823 and was directed against the colonial claims of Tsarist
Russia in that region.8 But President Monroe asserted a broader principle
against further colonization in the entire hemisphere, declaring:
[T]he occasion has been judged proper for asserting, as a principle in
which the right and interests of the United States are involved, that the
American continents, by the free and independent condition which they
have assumed and maintained, are henceforth not to be considered as
4 Thomas & Thomas, The Organization of American States and the Monroe Doc-
trine-Legal Implications, 30 LA. L. REv. 541, 580-81 (1970).
' By far the best historical treatment of the Doctrine is found in D. PERKINS, A His-
TORY OF THE MONROE DOCTRINE (rev. ed. 1963). See also J. MECHAM, A SURVEY OF UNITED
STATES-LATIN AMERICAN RELATIONS 54-62 (1965); THE MONROE DOCTRINE (A. Rappaport ed.
1964); Thomas & Thomas, supra note 4, at 542-77.
' Monroe Message, supra note 1, at 245
Thomas & Thomas, supra note 4, at 542.
8 D. PERKINS, supra note 5, at 29-31.
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subjects for future colonization by any European powers.*
The non-intervention principle was specifically aimed at the broader
threat posed by the reactionary Holy Alliance of European autocrats and
those powers' attempts to stamp out revolution in Europe and elsewhere.
To Monroe and his advisors in late 1823, it appeared that the European
allies were contemplating the reconquest of the infant republics of Latin
America which had recently broken the Spanish and Portuguese colonial
grip. Although there is much historical doubt that the threat from the
Holy Alliance was real at the time of Monroe's pronouncement," the
President made clear the American attitude to any threats from Europe,
real or imagined:
Of events in [Europe], with which we have so much intercourse and from
which we derive our origin, we have always been anxious and interested
spectators .... In the wars of the European powers in matters relating
to themselves we have never taken any part, nor does it comport with
our policy to do so. It is only when our rights are invaded or seriously
menaced that we resent injuries or make preparation for our defense.
With the movements in this hemisphere we are of necessity more imme-
diately connected .... The political system of the allied powers is essen-
tially different ... from that of America .... We owe it, therefore, to
candor and to the amicable relations existing between the United States
and those powers to declare that we should consider any attempt on
their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as
dangerous to our peace and safety. With the existing colonies or depen-
dencies of any European power we have not interfered and shall not in-
terfere. But with Governments who have declared their independence
and maintained it, and whose independence we have, on great considera-
tion and just principles, acknowledged, we could not view any interposi-
tion for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other man-
ner their distiny, by any European power in any other light than as the
manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States.1"
In short, the non-intervention principle laid down two basic precepts of
U.S. foreign policy-that the United States would not interfere in the
affairs of Europe (except when "our rights are invaded or seriously men-
aced"), and that Europe should not interfere in the affairs of the Western
Hemisphere. These precepts, supplemented by the non-colonization prin-
ciple, came to be known, and later reinterpreted and expanded, as the
' Monroe Message, supra note 7, at 246. As is clear from the language, the non-coloni-
zation principle did not apply to colonies, such as British Honduras (modern Belize), which
had not been liberated at the time of the pronouncement.
10 See 0. PERKINS, supra note 5, at 54, 60.
" Monroe Message, supra note 1, at 250.
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Monroe Doctrine.12
The principles of 1823 were a manifestation, and a strengthening, of
a popular stream of political thought in the United States dubbed by his-
torians as the "doctrine of the two spheres."" The idea that the nations
of the Western Hemisphere-the "New World"-are "essentially differ-
ent" politically" and economically" from the nations of Europe-the
"Old World"-is a concept that has endured since 1823. It is true, of
course, that the separation of the Americas from Europe in 1823 was
much wider in many respects than it is today. But the perception of com-
mon hemispheric interests among the American nations, while strained at
times, is certainly not a myth and is today recognized in international law
as well as United States foreign policy.16 As a policy based on the doctrine
of the two spheres, therefore, the Monroe Doctrine has direct relevance to
American regionalism as a force in international political and legal
relations.
B. Unilateral Application
For the first century of its existence, the Monroe Doctrine was the
unilateral policy of the United States. As such, it was enforced and inter-
preted only when the United States saw fit to apply it, and then only
when the United States had the power to do so. It was pressure applied
by the United States based on the Monroe Doctrine which led to the
ouster of the French puppet Maximilian from Mexico in 1866, but only
" Prior to 1853, Monroe's message was referred to as the "principles" or "declaration"
of President Monroe, and not until 1853 did the name "Monroe Doctrine" come into vogue.
J. MECHAM, supra note 5, at 55 n.2.
1" Id. at 54; D. PERKINS, supra note 5, at 315.
" Monroe Message, supra note 1, at 250.
" The non-colonization principle, largely the product of then-Secretary of State John
Quincy Adams, had an economic as well as a political basis. The return of European coloni-
alism to the newly-opened Latin American markets was an unthinkable state of affairs to
Adams and American mercantile and shipping interests, and Monroe's pronouncement
against further colonization was a direct response to their apprehensions. See D. PERKINS,
supra note 5, at 30.
11 The OAS is the modern institutional manifestation of the American hemispheric con-
cept and is the type of "regional agency" contemplated under Articles 52-54 of the Charter
of the United Nations. See P. CoRBEr, TsE GROWTH OF WORLD LAW 117 n.1 (1971). The
pursuit of a single policy toward "Latin America" as a whole, however, has been seriously
questioned considering the great diversity of interests, needs, and conditions between the
separate nations and regions of Central and South America. See Latin America: Hearings
on Major Trends and Issues in the United States Relations with the Nations of Latin
America and the Caribbean Before the Subcomm. on Western Hemisphere Affairs of the
Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 95th Cong., 2d Seass. 23 (1978) (statement of Thomas
E. Skidmore) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on Latin America]; but cf. id. at 131 (statement
of Abraham Katz).
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after the American Civil War had ended was it able to do so. 17
As the United States emerged as a world power in the years prior to
World War I, the Monroe Doctrine was expanded and reinterpreted to
justify the assertion of U.S. power in Latin America. In 1870 President
Grant, in a vain attempt to annex Santo Domingo, added the so-called
"no-transfer" corollary to the Doctrine. He stated that "hereafter no ter-
ritory on this continent shall be regarded as subject to transfer to a Euro-
pean power."1 s By the close of the century, the Monroe Doctrine had
been invoked, for a time unsuccessfully, to protect American interests in
the building of a transisthmian canal.1' To the no-transfer corollary and
the desire for an American-controlled canal was added the idea that in
disputes between European powers and delinquent Latin American na-
tions, the United States would step in to prevent the use of armed force
against the delinquent nation-all in the name of the Monroe Doctrine.
The invocation of the Monroe Doctrine to justify the United States
role as the universal arbitrator in European disputes with American na-
tions was done largely to protect U.S. economic, strategic, and political
interests in Latin America. 0 The Doctrine was a leading consideration in
the minds of Washington policy-makers when President Cleveland inter-
vened against Great Britain in the Venezuelan boundary dispute in De-
cember 1895.21 The intervention in that instance was done in the name of
arbitration, but not necessarily according to any binding principle of in-
ternational law. The unilateral and selective character of U.S. interposi-
tions in Latin American affairs-all in the name of the Monroe Doctrine
when European powers were involved-was revealed by the fact that the
United States refused to take action to prevent recurrent chastisement
and punitive measures taken against such countries as Haiti and Ni-
caraugua by nearly all the colonial powers."2
Whether or not it is today, the Monroe Doctrine at the end of the
19th century could not in any way be called international law. When ac-
knowledged by other nations at all, it was reluctantly recognized only as
the unilateral policy of the United States. And the ways in which the
Doctrine was expressed by the United States did nothing to dispell Latin
American resentment of their northern neighbor's superior attitude. Sec-
17 D. PERKINS, supra note 5, at 137-38.
18 Id. at 158-59. Although not included in the original Doctrine, the no-transfer princi-
ple antedated it by virtue of the passage in Congress in 1811 of a No-Transfer Resolution to
forestall British occupation of the Floridas. A. THOMAS & A. THOMAS, THE ORGANIZATION OF
AMERICAN STATES 24 n.52 (1963).
1" D. PERKINS, supra note 5, at 161-68.
10 See LaFeber, The Background of Cleveland's Venezuelan Policy: A Reinterpreta-
tion, 66 AM. HIST. REv. 947 (1961).
21 Id. at 947-48; D. PERKINS, supra note 5, at 173-76.
22 D. PERKINS, supra note 5, at 170; LaFeber, supra note 20, at 957.
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
retary of State Richard Olney, who appreciated the Monroe Doctrine for
its "practical benefits,"" explained the justification for its exercise by
stating:
Today the United States is practically sovereign on this continent, and
its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its interposition .2
Despite the refusal of the European powers to recognize the Doctrine
as international law, it is clear from the Olney Fiat and President Cleve-
land's message to Congress in 1895 that the United States regarded it as
such. 5 Scholars may differ as to the actual motivations for United States
actions in 1895,"0 but Latin Americans who may have resented U.S.
pretensions were also jubilantly grateful to the United States for the role
it had assumed 2 7 The United States invocation of the Monroe Doctrine
in the Venezuelan controversy was an important step in the Doctrine's
evolution, if only because Europe and Latin America were made aware of
its existence as a force in international relations.28 But the full implica-
tions of the groundwork laid by the Olney Fiat soon became apparent to
Latin Americans in the forms of the Roosevelt Corollary,29 "dollar diplo-
macy,"' 0 the Lodge Corollary,"1 and Wilsonian interventionism.82 During
" LaFeber, supra note 20, at 948.
" 1 PAPERS RELATING TO THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 545-62 (1895).
This statement, known as the "Olney Fiat," was part of a diplomatic instruction sent to
Great Britain during the early stages of the Venezuelan controversy in 1895. See D. PER-
KINS, supra note 5, at 175.
" In his message to Congress on December 17, 1895, announcing that the United States
would step in as arbitrator in the Venezuelan dispute, President Cleveland declared the
Monroe Doctrine to be recognized "in those principles of international law which are based
upon the theory that every nation shall have its rights protected, and its just claims en-
forced." See 12 J. RICHARDSON, A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESI-
DENTS 6087, 6089 (1897). The British eventually acquiesced to arbitration by the United
States but it cannot be said that they "accepted" the Doctrine as international law at this
time, although it may have been recognized as the legitimate policy of the United States. Cf.
J. MECHAM, supra note 5, at 65. Nor was the Doctrine actually recognized or accepted as
international law by Europe in the 1899 Hague Convention, despite the inclusion in that
Convention of an American reservation to the effect that "'nothing should be considered to
require abandonment of the traditional attitude of the United States towards questions
purely American.'" Quoted in D. PERKINS, supra note 5, at 204. See id. at 205-206.
" D. PERKINS, supra note 5, at 190; but see LaFeber, supra note 20, at 947, 967.
" D. PERKINS, supra note 5, at 188-90; J. MECHAM, supra note 5, at 65.
2 D. PERKINS, supra note 5, at 190-91.
11 In his annual message to Congress on December 6, 1904, President Theodore
Roosevelt stated: "Chronic wrongdoing, or an impotence which results in a general loosening
of the ties of civilized society, may in America, as elsewhere, ultimately require intervention
by some civilized nation, and in the Western Hemisphere the adherence of the United
States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such wrongdoing or impotence, to the exer-
cise of an international police power." 14 J. RICHARDSON, supra note 25, at 6923.
20 The Monroe Doctrine was used by the Taft administration to justify governmental
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the period 1905 to 1926 the United States repeatedly intervened, milita-
rily and diplomatically, into the affairs of Latin American nations under
the guise of the Monroe Doctrine and its new-found corollaries.
C. Multilateral Development
Yet even as the United States was unilaterally stretching the Monroe
Doctrine to unrecognizable dimensions, the groundwork was being laid for
its "multilateralization by continentalization" s and a return to the origi-
nal principles of 1823. While the nations of Latin America had been un-
receptive to President Wilson's proposal for a Pan American pact based
on the fundamental tenets of the Monroe Doctrine," the President was
determined to make his concept an instrument of world peace. Wilson
began the epic fight for the League of Nations in January 1917 with a
trumpet call to the Monroe Doctrine:
[T]he people and Government of the United States will join the other
civilized nations of the world in guaranteeing the permanence of peace
upon such terms as I have named.8'
I am proposing, as it were, that the nations should with one accord
adopt the doctrine of President Monroe as the doctrine of the world; that
no nation should seek to extend its polity over any other nation or peo-
ple, but that every people should be left free to determine its own polity,
its own way of development, unhindered, unthreatened, unafraid, the lit-
tle along with the great and powerful."
It is ironic to note that the same Monroe Doctrine which President
Wilson proposed as the basis for international cooperation was one of the
most potent weapons used by the isolationists who opposed U.S. partici-
promotion of private American financial aid to Latin America-thus the term "dollar diplo-
macy." J. MECHAM, supra note 5, at 70.
" The so-called Lodge Corollary was the extension of the Monroe Doctrine as applied
by the U.S. Senate in preventing the sale of land on Magdalena Bay, Mexico, by an Ameri-
can company to a Japanese company. Id. at 70-71.
"During the Wilson administration, United States armed forces occupied Haiti, in
1915, and the Dominican Republic, in 1916. American troops remained in Haiti until 1934,
and in the Dominican Republic until 1924. Id. at 71-72. See also A. THOMAS & A. THOMAS
supra note 18, at 18.
"3 Thomas & Thomas, supra note 4, at 544.
" J. MECHAM, supra note 5, at 73. "A startling aspect of the Pact was that it was in-
tended to multilaterlize the Monroe Doctrine." A. THOMAS & A. THOMAS, aupra note 18, at
18.
" The terms of peace proposed by President Wilson in his address included equality of
rights, self-determination, freedom of the seas, and arms limitation. 17 J. RiCHARDSON,
supra note 25, at 8199-204.
" Id. at 8203.
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pation in the League."' Indeed, it was the pressure of Wilson's opposition
which resulted in Article 21 of the League Covenant, which provided that
"nothing in this Covenant shall be deemed to affect the validity of inter-
national engagements, such as treaties of arbitration or regional under-
standings like the Monroe Doctrine, for securing the maintenance of
peace. '8 "Regional understanding" or precept of international law, the
recognition of the Monroe Doctrine in the League Covenant, became a
Pyrrhic victory when the U.S. Senate failed to ratify the Treaty of
Versailles.
The hopeful spirit of Pan-Americanism which Wilson had raised in
the name of the Monroe Doctrine in 1916 was finally resurrected with the
renunciation of interventionism by the United States in 1933.9 The
adoption of the Good Neighbor policy by the United States and the con-
tinentalization of the Doctrine was preceded, however, by a reassessment
of its principles by Under Secretary of State J. Reuben Clark in 1928.40
The Clark Memorandum argued that the original principles of 1823 were
based on the policy of "self-preservation," of self-defense, of the United
States against European encroachments. The Monroe Doctrine could not
therefore be used as justification for United States interventions in purely
inter-American affairs, thus demanding the abandonment of the
Roosevelt Corollary "however much it may be justified by the application
of the doctrine of self-preservation."'" Self-defense may still justify
United States intervention in Latin American affairs, but not self-defense
in the name of the Monroe Doctrine. "So far as Latin America is con-
cerned," concluded Mr. Clark, "the Doctrine is now, and always has been,
not an instrument of violence and oppression, but an unbought, freely
bestowed, and wholly effective guaranty of their freedom, independence,
and territorial integrity against the imperialistic designs of Europe. 42
By returning to the original principles of self-defense which had
given rise to the Monroe Doctrine's application against Europe, a radical
change was effected in its scope and operation. Whereas the Doctrine had
37 D. PERKINS, supra note 5, at 285-86.
38 LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 21.
39 See Convention on Rights and Duties of States, December 26, 1933, art. 8, 49 Stat.
3097, T.S. No. 881. The 1933 Convention was the beginning of the process of the Doctrine's
continentalization and the adoption of a policy of non-intervention by the United States.
See A. THOMAS & A. THOMAS, supra note 18, at 22.
40 J. R. CLARK, MEMORANDUM ON THE MONROE DOCTRINE (1930) [hereinafter cited as
CLARK MEMORANDUM]. Although the Clark Memorandum became working policy from the
time it was submitted in 1928, it did not become publicly known until 1930, when it was
officially published. See J. MECHAM, supra note 5, at 75.
" CLARK MEMORANDUM, supra note 40, at xiii-xxiv,
" Id. at xxv. For an additional view that the Monroe Doctrine is based on the right of
self-defense, either unilaterally or multilaterally on a Pan-American basis, see D. BOWETT,
SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 209-10 (1958).
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once been the unilateral policy of the United States based on the individ-
ual right of self-defense, by 1940 the Doctrine had become the multilat-
eral policy of the Western Hemisphere based on the collective right of
self-defense.4 3 This was demonstrated most vividly with the onset of
World War II and the adoption of the Declaration of Reciprocal Assis-
tance and Cooperation for the Defense of the Nations of the Americas by
the American foreign ministers meeting in Havana in July 1940, which
provided:
[A]ny attempt on the part of a non-American state against the integrity
or inviolability of the territory, the sovereignty or the political indepen-
dence of an American state shall be considered as an act of aggression
against the states which sign this declaration."
The Havana Declaration of Reciprocal Assistance was put to the test
with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941. But for the notable
exceptions of Argentina and Chile, the signatories met their obligations
by at least severing all relations with the Axis powers."5 By the end of the
war, however, even the recalcitrant Argentina fell into line by signing the
Act of Chapultepec.4s Adopted at the Inter-American Conference on
Problems of War and Peace at Mexico City in 1945, the Act of Chapulte-
pec expanded on the Havana Declaration by providing for collective sanc-
tions, including the use of armed force, to be taken against any aggressor
of an American state-even against an American aggressor.4 7 The process
of "Pan-Americanizing" the Monroe Doctrine did not culminate, however,
until the terms of the Act of Chapultepec had been formalized by their
inclusion in the permanent treaty signed by the American nations at Rio
de Janeiro in 1947."
48 D. Bowmvr, supra note 42, at 210-11. At the Second Meeting of the Foreign Minis-
ters of the American Republics at Habana on July 30, 1940, a Final Act was approved which
included a resolution called the "Act of Habana concerning the Provisional Administration
of European Colonies and Possessions in the Americas." See 3 Dm'T STATE BuLL. 127
(1940). A supplementary Convention reiterated the no-transfer principle on behalf of the
collective right of self-defense of all the American republics. See 3 DEP'T STATE BULL. 145
(1940).
" Reciprocal Assistance and Cooperation for the Defense of the Nations of the Ameri-
cas, reprinted in THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES OF AMERICAN STATES 360-61 (J.B. Scott
ed., Supp. 1933-1940). J. MECHAM, supra note 6, at 80, argues that the Havana Declaration
did not mark the true continentalization of the Monroe Doctrine, since the signatories only
agreed to consult in case of aggression by a non-American nation, and had not provided for
any mutually-guaranteed sanctions.
" See A. THOMAS & A. THOMAS, supra note 18, at 24-25.
" Id. at 28-29.
4 Act of Chapultepec, Mar. 8, 1945, res. VIII, 60 Stat. 1837, T.I.A.S. No. 1543.
46 Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, Sept. 2, 1947, 62 Stat. 1681, T.I.A.S.
No. 1838, 21 U.N.T.S. 77 [hereinafter cited as Rio Treaty].
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II. MODERN STATUS OF THE DOCTRINE
A. The Legal Framework
The provisions of the Rio Treaty of 1947 serve as part of the legal
framework by which the modern status of the Monroe Doctrine must be
assessed. Since Article 3 considers an attack by any state against an
American state to be an attack against them all,' it must be conceded
that the Rio Treaty goes beyond the original Monroe Doctrine in its ap-
plication.50 But the Monroe Doctrine and the Rio Treaty share a mutual
basis in that both are grounded in the perception of a common hemi-
spheric interest separate from the rest of the world. Moreover, both find
their juridical support in the individual or collective right of self-defense,
specifically recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Na-
tions."1 It is also important to note in this context that in the exercise of
that inherent right, the parties to the Rio Treaty may act independently
of the U.N. Security Council until the latter "has taken the measures nec-
essary to maintain international peace and security."5
The continentalized Monroe Doctrine, as reflected by the terms of
the Rio Treaty, was incorporated into the institutional framework set up
by the Charter of the Organization of American States, also known as the
Charter of Bogota, in 1948.68 Article 28 of the Charter provides for action
by OAS member states in response to any "fact or situation that might
endanger the peace of America . . . in furtherance of the principles of
'9 Id. arts. 3, 6-7; see Thomas & Thomas, supra note 4, at 547-48.
'0 The Monroe Doctrine as originally stated had no application to wars between Ameri-
can states. See CLARK MEMORANDUM, supra note 40, at 186; but cf. A. THOMAS & A. THOMAS,
supra note 18, at 356-57, where it is argued that the Rio Treaty's application to inter-Amer-
ican aggression represents a new corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, similar to the Roosevelt
Corollary, which would allow "collective American counter-intervention in the affairs of an
American state to remove a certain type of non-American interventionism" (i.e.,
communism).
$1 U.N. CHARTER art. 51, para. 3; see Rio Treaty, supra note 48, art. 3, pars. 1.
52 Rio Treaty, supra note 48, arts. 2, 3, para. 4. The parties are required, however, to
send the Security Council "complete information" regarding any actions taken or contem-
plated in the exercise of the right of self-defense. Id. art. 5. But see P. CORBETT, supra note
16, at 145: "It was ... to be expected, especially in the exercise of peace-keeping functions,
that disputes would occur about the division of competence between [the United Nations
and regional organizations]. These have been particularly sharp in the relations between the
Organization of American States and the United Nations."
Us Charter of the Organization of American States, April 30, 1948, 2 U.S.T. 2394,
T.I.A.S. No. 2361, as amended by the Protocol of Buenos Aires, Feb. 27, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 607,
T.I.A.S. No. 6847 [hereinafter cited as OAS Charter]. Article 27 of the Charter provides
that: "Every act of aggression by a State against the territorial integrity or the inviolability
of the territory or against the sovereignty or political independence of an American State
shall be considered an act of aggression against the other American States."
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continental solidarity or collective self-defense. .... " It is worth to re-
call at this point that the pronouncement of the Monroe Doctrine in 1823
was directed in part against the reimposition of European absolutism in
the Western Hemisphere. Its justification was, as noted above, the "doc-
trine of the two spheres" coupled with the idea that every American na-
tion has the inherent right of political self-determination. Any extracon-
tinental threat to the rights of self-determination of an American state,
therefore, falls within the purview of the Monroe Doctrine. The "political
independence" of any American state is expressly protected from in-
tracontinental as well as extracontinental aggression by Articles 27 and 28
of the OAS Charter."' At least as applied to extracontinental threats to
the internal political structure of an American state, therefore, the princi-
ples of 1823 would seem to be clearly expressed in the collective security
provisions of the OAS Charter.
The signing of the Rio Treaty and the formation of the OAS com-
pleted the international legal framework upon which the multilateralized
Monroe Doctrine is based today. The authority of the OAS to act as a
regional agency under Article 52 of the U.N. Charter" has been accepted
from the beginning by the United Nations.5 7 Article 51 of the U.N. Char-
ter provides legal justification for the exercise by a regional agency of the
right of individual and collective self-defense.5 8 As we have seen, it is the
right of self-defense upon which the Monroe Doctrine, the Rio Treaty,
and the OAS are all based in part. In their continentalized form, there-
fore, the principles of 1823 have the sanction of international law.
B. The Monroe Doctrine in the Cold War
Just as the Doctrine in 1823 underwent expansion and permutation
in the century following its pronouncement, so has the continentalized
Doctrine as expressed in the collective security provisions of the Rio
Treaty and the OAS Charter undergone revision and broad interpreta-
tion. With the onset of the Cold War, a new threat was presented to the
Western Hemisphere which the Monroe Doctrine in its multilateralized
form was theoretically equipped to handle: the threat of Soviet-inspired
Communism. Following the lead of the United States in the early 1950's,
the American nations adopted a firm attitude against what was perceived
as an international communist movement attempting to infiltrate the gov-
" Id. art. 28.
Id. arts. 27, 28.
Id. art. 1 expressly defines the OAS as a regional agency within the United Nations.
" Akehurst, Enforcement Action by Regional Agencies, With Special Reference to the
Organization of American States, 42 BiIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 175, 178-79 (1967).
" Fenwick, The Organization of American States: The Transition from an Unwritten
to a Written Constitution, 59 Am. J. INT'L L. 315, 317 (1965).
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ernments of the Western Hemisphere.59 This attitude was formally ex-
pressed by the Tenth Inter-American Conference at Caracas in 1953,
which adopted a resolution revealingly entitled the "Declaration of Soli-
darity for the Preservation of the Political Integrity of the American
States Against the Intervention of International Communism." 0 This res-
olution declared:
[t]hat the domination or control of the political institutions of any Amer-
ican state by the international communist movement, extending to this
hemisphere the political system of an extracontinental power, would
constitute a threat to the sovereignty and political independence of the
American states, endangering the peace of America .... " [Emphasis
added].
The declaration above was based on a perception, mainly on the part
of United States policy-makers, very similar to that of Monroe and his
advisers in 1823-that some forms of totalitarianism (i.e., monarchical
absolutism or communism) could not be an indigenous phenomenon in
Latin America.6 2 By branding communism as an extracontinental threat
whenever it appeared in an American state, the Monroe Doctrine and the
collective security provisions of the American regional agreements could
be invoked to justify some kind of intervention in the "communist-in-
fected" state rather than against the extracontinental source of the
threat. The Caracas Declarationes therefore represented a "corollary" to
the continentalized Monroe Doctrine similar to the Roosevelt Corollary in
that it would allow intervention in the internal domestic affairs of an
American state in the name of hemispheric stability."
"9 See Thomas & Thomas, supra note 4, at 545. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles
considered the infiltration of "Soviet despotism" to be a direct violation of the Monroe Doc-
trine. See 31 DEP'T STATE BULL. 43 (1954).
60 Resolution XIII, TENTH INTER-AMERICAN CONFERENCE 156-57, Dep't. State Pub. 5692
(1955) [hereinafter cited as Caracas Declaration].
01 Id. This provision, which would allow intervention into the internal affairs of an
American nation in order to meet the "extra-continental" threat of communism, is arguably
a justified interpretation of a "fact or situation" affecting the "political independence" of
any American state under Article 6 of the Rio Treaty, supra note 48, and Article 28 of the
OAS Charter, supra note 53. See Thomas & Thomas, supra note 4, at 546-47.
" "It is impossible that the allied powers should extend their political system to any
portion of either continent without endangering our peace and happiness; nor can anyone
believe that our southern brethren, if left to themselves, would adopt it of their own ac-
cord." Monroe Message, supra note 1, at 250.
6' Caracas Declaration, supra note 61.
For a detailed argument that collective OAS intervention in the affairs of a commu-
nist-infected American nation is a legal exercise of a broadly-interpreted right of self-de-
fense, despite the U.N. CHARTER art. 51 recognition of such a right only in case of "armed
attack," see Thomas & Thomas, supra note 4, at 550-54; see also D. BowETr, supra note 42,
at 188.
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Events in the years following the Caracas Declaration revealed that
despite the continentalization and integration of the Monroe Doctrine
into international law, it could still be invoked unilaterally by the United
States. The Declaration itself had been strongly pushed by the United
States in an effort to deal with the popularly-elected (but communist-
supported) President of Guatemala, Jacobo Arbenz Guzmin." Following
the expropriation of the vast landholdings of the United Fruit Company
in March 1953, the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) or-
ganized and successfully executed a coup of the Arbenz government in
June 1954. The dictatorship subsequently installed promptly abolished
the Guatemalan communist party, disenfranchised most of the voting
population, suspended the Guatemalan Congress and all constitutional
rights, and returned all land to United Fruit." Significantly, the coup was
carried out before the consultative provision of the Caracas Declaration
was effected; thus the OAS was never faced with having to give its ap-
proval to such blatant domestic intervention. 7 The Guatemalan affair is
one episode in inter-American relations which revealed the intrinsic para-
dox of U.S. foreign policy's support of dictatorships in Latin America in
the name of the Monroe Doctrine-a doctrine which was ostensibly
designed to protect an American nation's right of self-determination.
The rise of Fidel Castro to power in 1959 revealed that the con-
tinentalization of the Monroe Doctrine was stronger in theory than in
practice. As the nature of the Cuban revolution and the open support of
the Soviet Union became apparent, and as some Latin American Govern-
ments began to voice complaints about domestic subversion and terrorism
exported from Cuba, 8 a clear case for collective action under the con-
tinentalized Monroe Doctrine (via the Caracas Declaration) seemed to be
presented. Indeed, a direct challenge to regional security and the Monroe
Doctrine was issued when Soviet Premier Nikita Krushchev declared in
July 1960 that any attack on Cuba would result in nuclear retaliation
against the United States by the Soviet Union.9 "The Monroe Doctrine,"
announced Krushchev, "has outlived its time . . . has died, so to say, a
natural death. Now the remains of this doctrine should best be buried as
es See J. NATHAN & J. OLIVER, UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY AND WORLD ORDER 217,
218 n.90 (1976).
" Id. at 217-19.
" Thomas & Thomas, supra note 4, at 549-50. The United States was able to prevent
the U.N. Security Council from hearing the Guatemalan complaint against the United
States for its role in the overthrow of Arbenz by successfully arguing that the Security
Council had no jurisdiction to discuss the complaint until Guatemala had exhausted the
corresponding machinery of the OAS. See Akehurst, supra note 57, at 181.
Thomas & Thomas, supra note 4, at 554.
9 N.Y. Times, July 10, 1960, at 1, col. 5.
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every dead body is so that it should not poison the air by its decay. 70
The State Department quickly retorted that the "principles of the
Monroe Doctrine are as valid today as they were in 1823 when the Doc-
trine was proclaimed."'1  President Eisenhower indignantly proclaimed
that the Doctrine "has by no means been supplanted, '72 and that the
United States, in conformity with its treaty obligations, would not "per-
mit the establishment of a regime dominated by international Commu-
nism in the Western Hemisphere. '73
Despite the war of words and brave rhetoric, neither the OAS nor the
United States took any effective action to remove the continental threat
posed by Castro's Cuba. In August 1960 the OAS denounced communist
intervention in the Western Hemisphere, but did not specifically name
Cuba or recommend any collective action .7 The ill-fated Bay of Pigs in-
vasion in April 1961, conceived during the Eisenhower administration and
carried out by the CIA with the approval of President Kennedy, was a
unilateral action with no OAS support .7 Despite the failure of the inva-
sion, President Kennedy subsequently reaffirmed that the United States
may still exercise its option of unilateral intervention:
Should it ever appear that the inter-American doctrine of noninterfer-
ence merely conceals or excuses a policy of nonaction-if the nations of
this hemisphere should fail to meet their commitments against outside
communist penetration ... this nation will not hesitate in meeting its
primary obligations which are to the security of our nation.71
The Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers, convened
at Punta del Este in January 1962, also failed to adopt any collective
measures which would effectively eliminate the Cuban threat.77 Only
Cuba was opposed to the adoption of a resolution stating that the goals of
70 N.Y. Times, July 13, 1960, at 1, col. 4.
" U.S. Reaffirms Principles of Monroe Doctrine, 43 DEP'T STATE BULL. 170 (Press Re-
lease 392, July 14, 1960).
71 PUB. PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES, DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
1960-61, at 651 (1961). Indeed, the President declared that the Rio Treaty and "other non-
intervention treaties" had "merely extended" the Monroe Doctrine to cover modern types of
"penetration and subversion." Id.
78 N.Y. Times, July 10, 1960, at 1, col. 8.
1' PAU, Final Act, Seventh Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs,
OEA/Ser.C./II 7 (1960).
75 J. NATHAN & J. OLIVER, supra note 65, at 293-94. Nor did the attempted invasion
have any support in international legal circles. See Wright, The Cuban Quarantine, 57 Am.
J. INT'L L. 546 n.4, 555 n.42, 564 n.66 (1963).
70 Pus. PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES, JOHN F. KENNEDY 1961, at
304 (1962).
7 See 2 PAU, Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance Applications 1960-64,
at 69-80 (1964).
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international communism were incompatible with the principles of the in-
ter-American political system.7 8 But a second resolution declaring that
Cuban communism was incompatible with Pan-American principles and
calling for the exclusion of the Castro government from the OAS was
passed by a bare two-thirds majority.7 The only collective measures
taken under the Rio Treaty at Punta del Este was a recommendation that
trade with Cuba in arms and implements of war be immediately sus-
pended. 0 Thereby was revealed the reluctance of a number of Latin
American nations to turn the continentalized Monroe Doctrine inward
against another American state, even as expanded by the Caracas
Declaration.
The differences revealed at Punta del Este were temporarily set aside
with the onset of the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962. The basic
facts are well known: on October 22 President Kennedy revealed the exis-
tence of Soviet offensive nuclear weapons in Cuba and ordered an air and
naval quarantine of Cuba to halt the buildup.81 After some very tense
days in Washington, Havana, and Moscow, the Russians finally backed
down and agreed to remove the offensive weapons in return for a pledge
from the United States that it would not invade Cuba. There is some
debate as to whether the United States sufficiently defended the Monroe
Doctrine in the Cuban crisis,"' but it is significant in this regard that the
United States took great pains to assure that all its actions were carried
out according to international law.88 The Soviet missiles in Cuba consti-
tuted a clear "fact or situation that might endanger the peace of
America" from an extracontinental source-a bold violation of Article 6
of the Rio Treaty and a challenge to the Monroe Doctrine." In gaining
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Id. Such a measure is authorized by Article 8 of the Rio Treaty, supra note 48. For a
good discussion on the legality of the OAS sanctions adopted at Punta del Este, see
Akehurst, supra note 57, at 190-96.
8' Address of October 22, 1962, II Pun. PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED
STATES, JOHN F. KENNEDY 1962, at 806-08 (1963).
*2 J. MECHAM, supra note 5, at 82, argues that the Doctrine was not vindicated by the
removal of the missiles, since Cuba remained communist and dominated by the Soviet
Union. Cf. Buckley, supra note 3, who argues that President Kennedy's agreement not to
invade Cuba, impliedly "repealing" the Monroe Doctrine, was not binding on his successors.
88 Oliver, International Law and the Quarantine of Cuba: A Hopeful Prescription for
Legal Writing, 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 373, 376 (1963); Meeker, Defensive Quarantine and the
Law, 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 519 (1963).
. P. CoRBETr, supra note 16, at 149; Akehurst, supra note 57, at 197 n.4; but cf.
Wright, supra note 75, at 548-53, arguing that the installation of the Soviet missiles at
Cuba's request violated no international law and that "neither the Monroe Doctrine nor
inter-American treaties can impose obligations of international law on the Soviet Union,
though politically they constitute a warning to non-American countries of attitudes likely to
be taken by the American countries."
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the removal of the Soviet nuclear weapons in Cuba, President Kennedy
had gone no further than keep his earlier pledge that if Cuba ever became
an offensive military base of significant capacity for the Soviets, then the
United States would take any action necessary to protect itself and its
hemispheric allies.85 But the Monroe Doctrine was not dead in the minds
of Washington policy-makers, at least one of whom felt that the Doctrine
was "still an elementary part of the [United States] whole national secur-
ity interests."'
In response to President Kennedy's request,87 the Council of the
OAS, acting as Provisional Organ of Consultation under Article 12 of the
Rio Treaty, met on October 23, 1962, to consider the Cuban crisis. Echo-
ing President Kennedy's call for the removal of the missiles from Cuba,
the Provisional Organ also authorized member states to take measures
against Cuba, individually or collectively under Articles 6 and 8 of the
Rio Treaty, including the use of armed force, to prevent the missiles in
Cuba "from ever becoming an active threat to the peace and security of
the continent."88 Thus the unilateral quarantine of Cuba by U.S. naval
and air forces was ostensibly sanctioned by the OAS as well as the con-
tinentalized Monroe Doctrine, at least as applied against the Soviet
Union."'
The continued existence of the Castro regime in Cuba, however, and
that dictator's attempts to export communist revolution to other Latin
American countries, constituted a continuing violation of the Monroe
Doctrine via the Caracas Declaration." At the request of Venezuela, an
Organ of Consultation was convoked by the OAS in 1963 which con-
demned and recommended sanctions against Cuba for its subversive in-
tervention in the internal affairs of OAS member states. 1 Cuba was
warned that if its subversive actions continued in the future, OAS mem-
bers intended to take measures of self-defense individually or collectively,
even so far as to resort to armed force."
s1 57 DEP'T STATE BULL. 450, 481 (1962). On the legality of the quarantine, see Wright,
supra note 75, at 553-63; Akehurst, supra note 57, at 199-203; Oliver, supra note 83;
Meeker, supra note 83; Fenwick, The Quarantine Against Cuba: Legal or Illegal?, 57 AM. J.
INT'L L. 592 (1963).
86 Situation in Cuba: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations and the
Comm. on Armed Services, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 34 (1962) (statement of Secretary of State
Dean Rusk). See also, Ambassador Stevenson's address to the U.N. Security Council, 47
DEP'T STATE BULL. 731 (1962).
867 Address of October 22, 1962, supra note 80, at 807.
88 47 DEP'T STATE BULL. 722 (1962).
88 See Wright, supra note 75, at 559; Thomas & Thomas, supra note 4, at 561.
90 Caracas Declaration, supra note 60.
9, II PAU, INTER-AMERICAN TREATY OF RECIPROCAL ASSISTANCE APPLICATIONS 1960-64,
at 181-86 (1964).
92 Id. at 186.
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Resort to armed intervention became a reality in April 1965, but it
was directed against the Dominican Republic rather than Cuba and ini-
tially took the form of unilateral action by the United States. Once again,
the excuse for landing 20,000 U.S. marines in the Dominican Republic on
April 28 was the threat of communism arising in that nation, ostensibly
as a result of Cuban instigation." This action revealed that the Monroe
Doctrine, though not expressly mentioned, could still be used as an in-
strument for unilateral intervention by the United States into the inter-
nal affairs of a Latin American country. The OAS was quick to give its
multilateral endorsement to the intervention, however, by convening the
Tenth Meeting of Foreign Ministers. One of the measures taken at that
meeting was the request to OAS member states to make voluntary contri-
butions to the OAS of military forces in order to form an Inter-American
Peace Force." Subsequently, U.S. forces were partially withdrawn from
the Dominican Republic and the remainder were joined with the Peace
Force under a unified inter-American aggression against the political in-
dependence of an American state was thereby prevented in the name of
self-defense by military intervention in the threatened state. This brings
to mind some of the interventionist corollaries to the Monroe Doctrine at
the turn of the century.
C. The Paradox of Regionalism and the Doctrine
The legality of the intervention by the United States in the Domini-
can Republic, and the authority of the OAS to aid in that intervention
without prior U.N. approval, is highly questionable.' Legal or not, the
Dominican intervention of 1965 revealed a basic paradox of the Monroe
Doctrine as it had existed since 1823-the concept of regionalism in a
world where spheres of influence by powerful nations is looked upon with
increasing disfavor. It has been argued with compelling force that the so-
called "Johnson Doctrine"-which had been manifested in the 1965 Do-
minican intervention-provided reciprocal justification for the so-called
"Brezhnev Doctrine"-which is the asserted justification for the Soviet
interventions into Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968.9 The
'3 Pun. PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES, LYNDON B. JOHNSON 1965, at
461 (1966); U.S. Acts to Meet Threat in Dominican Republic, 52 DEP'T STATE BULL. 738
(1965); see also A. THOMAS & A. THOMAS, THE DOMINICAN REPuBLIC CRISIS 1965: BACK-
GROUND PAPER AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE NINTH HAMMARSKJOLD FORUM 7 (1967).
94I OAS CHRONICLE 19-41 (Aug. 1975).
' See, e.g., A. THOMAS & A. THOMAS, supra note 93, at 36-59.
See Franck & Weisband, The Johnson and Brezhnev Doctrines: The Law You Make
May Be Your Own, 22 STAN. L. REv. 979 (1970); Note, Ideology and the Use of Force, 2 GA.
J. INT'L & COMp. L. 77 (1972). The Brezhnev Doctrine, announced by Soviet Premier
Brezhnev following the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia, is translated and reprinted in 7
INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS. 1323 (1968); see also N.Y. Times, Sept. 27, 1968, at 3, col. 1.
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concept of regional independence expressed in the Monroe Doctrine has,
since its pronouncement, depended largely on the power of the United
States to enforce its principles. The Rio Treaty and the OAS Char-
ter-the continentalized expressions of the Monroe Doctrine-are both
geographically and ideologically based. The Dominican Republic and
Cuba are both "in an area well known to have a special and historical
relationship to the United States and the nations of the Western Hemi-
sphere.' 97 As expressed in the Caracas Declaration," communist control
of an American state was deemed incompatible with inter-American prin-
ciples and institutions. Individual or collective action, so the familiar ar-
gument goes, is therefore justified to prevent or eliminate such
incompatibility.
Such is the rationale, in reverse, for the exercise and policing by the
Soviet Union of a sphere of influence over socialist states on its geograph-
ical periphery. On the basis of geographical proximity and ideological
compatibility, the Brezhnev Doctrine-like the Monroe Doctrine-calls
on the dominant power of a geographical region to exercise an interna-
tional police power to preserve regional stability.9 By asserting the
Brezhnev Doctrine as justification for the 1968 Czechoslovakian invasion,
the Soviets verbalized what they perceived as "established, reciprocal
norms of the international system" as pronounced by the United States
in the Guatemalan, Cuban, and Dominican crises.100 It was precisely the
above rationale which the Soviet Union presented as justification for the
invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979.01
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that American policy-makers are
presently faced with the paradox of justifying the principles of the
Monroe Doctrine, be it on a continental or unilateral basis, while simulta-
neously challenging the right of another regional superpower (the Soviet
Union) to maintain a regional sphere of influence.10' The application of
the Monroe Doctrine to "communism" in the Western Hemisphere must
be increasingly questioned considering the breakdown of a world-wide
"monolithic" communist movement, the indigenous character of most
Latin American social unrest, and the unsettling prevalence of U.S.-
Address of October 22, 1962, supra note 81, at 807.
" Supra note 60.
Franck & Weisband, supra note 96, at 983-84.
10I Id. at 982.
101 Whitney, The View From the Kremlin, N.Y. Times, April 20, 1980, § 6 (Magazine),
at 32, col. 2, 33, col. 3.
101 The paradox is starkly revealed by the recent comments of Secretary of Defense
Caspar W. Weinberger, who said that the United States might supply arms and aid to the
insurgents in Afghanistan if such aid was requested, but would not tolerate similar aid by
the Soviet Union to the guerrillas in El Salvador on the ground that such Soviet aid would
be a violation of the Monroe Doctrine. N.Y. Times, Mar. 10, 1981, at 3, col. 1 (city ed.).
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backed military fascism in Latin America. 0 3 Few attempts have been
made to justify the covert interference by the CIA in the 1970 election in
Chile of Marxist Salvador Allende and the subsequent operations which
resulted in his brutal overthrow and assassination in 1973.04 Moreover,
the 1970's witnessed the partial reintegration of Cuba into the economic
and political life of the Western Hemisphere. Almost half of the Latin
American nations have re-established diplomatic and commercial rela-
tions with Cuba,"0 8 and until late 1979 the Carter administration was tak-
ing significant steps toward the resumption of some commercial ties with
Cuba. 0 6 It is significant to note, however, that Cuba's rapprochement
with its neighbors was hesitant and was adopted by Castro only when
pressured by the Soviet Union to fall in line with d6tente.10 7
In any case, it is apparent that the multilateral aspect of the Monroe
Doctrine which had so adamantly condemned communism in the Western
Hemisphere waned considerably in the 1970's. The once-solid support of
the United States by Latin American nations on international political,
economic, and security issues began increasingly to break down in the
early 1970's. This breakdown in continental solidarity was prompted by,
among other things, the limited U.S.-Soviet detente, economic conflicts of
interest, the shift of many Latin American nations to a so-called "non-
aligned" status, and the rise of sub-regional economic mechanisms.108 The
failure of the Carter administration to take effective measures in response
to the large-scale Cuban military adventures in Africa has also made
small Caribbean and Central American republics apprehensive about the
willingness of the United States to protect them from "Cuba's militarized
communism."' 09 By the end of the 1970's, these factors and more had
contributed to the gradual dissolution of one of the basic precepts of the
103 See Hearings on Latin America, supra note 16, at 9, 22. But see Kirkpatrick, Dicta-
torships and Double Standards, COMMENTARY, Nov. 1979, at 35-45.
0, See J. NATHAN & J. OLIVER, supra note 65, at 14, 496-97n. See also STAFF OF THE
SENATE SELECT COMM. TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES, 94TH CONG., 1ST SESS., COVERT ACTIONS IN CHILE 1963-1973, at 26-39 (Comm.
Print 1975).
105 Hearings on Latin America, supra note 16, at 9 (statement of James D. Theberge).
I" See Salper, Prospects for Relations and Trade Between the United States and Car-
ibbean Basin Non-Market Economies, Particularly Cuba, 4 INT'L TRADE L. J. 189, 194
(1978).
107 Hearings on Latin America, supra note 16, at 9.
10' Id. at 8-9.
109 Id. at 10. In response to those apprehensions, the Carter administration attempted
to dissuade Caribbean fears about Cuba by stating that the United States would "assist
those threatened by outside intervention." N.Y. Times, Feb. 3, 1980, at 5, col. 1. On the
Cuban military forces in Africa, see Impact of Cuban-Soviet Ties in the Western Hemi-
sphere: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Inter-American Affairs of the House Comm. on
Int'l Relations, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1978) (statement of Gen. James A. Williams).
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Rio Treaty, the OAS, and the principles of 1823: the perception of com-
mon hemispheric interests and goals in relation to the rest of the world
community.
D. Change in Outlook: The Carter Administration
Despite, and perhaps as a result of the radical changes in the inter-
American system in the 1970's, the Latin American policy of the Carter
administration marked a new phase in the evolution of the Monroe Doc-
trine. In his first address before the Permanent Council of the OAS, 110
President Carter made it clear that his administration was adopting a
very different attitude toward Latin America from that of his predeces-
sors. In contrast to the long-held "doctrine of the two spheres" upon
which the Monroe Doctrine had originally been based, the President said:
As nations of the New World we once believed that we could prosper in
isolation from the Old World. But since the Second World War ... all
of us have taken such vital roles in the world community that isolation
would now be harmful to our own best interests .... The problems and
promises of our region have become as diverse as the world itself...
[and] sometimes defy regional solutions.
In addition to economic diversity, we have all developed widely va-
ried forms and philosophies of government....
In the light of these changes, a single United States policy toward
Latin America and the Caribbean makes little sense .... Our own goal
is to address problems in a way which will lead to productive solu-
tions-globally, regionally, and bilaterally.111
President Carter went on to state that the new approach in U.S. policy
would be based on a high regard for the individual sovereignty of each
nation, respect for human rights, and recognition of the need to equalize
relationships between the developed and developing nations on an extra-
regional, global scale. 1 2
110 President's Address Before the Permanent Council of the OAS, April 14, 1977, 13
WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc. 523 (April 18, 1977).
"I Id. at 523-24.
.. Id. at 524. Just as President Monroe's policies were largely the product of his close
advisors, such as John Quincy Adams, so does it appear that President Carter's new outlook
was partly attributable to the ideas of his foreign policy advisor, Zbiginew Brzezinski. In
1970, Mr. Brezezinski wrote that the long-standing idea of a U.S.-Latin American "special
relationship" was "bound to decay" as Latin American nationalism and its attendant anti-
Yankee spirit became more rampant in the 1970's. "Accordingly," he argued, "it would be
wise for the United States to... abandon the Monroe Doctrine and to concede that in the
new global age geographic or hemispheric contiguity no longer need be politically decisive."
In order to improve U.S.-Latin American relations, he concluded, the United States should
confine its policies to "cultural-political affinities" and "economic-social obligations." Z.
BRZEZINSKI, BETWEEN Two AGES: AMERICA'S ROLE IN THE TECHNETRONIC ERA 288 (1970). For
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The changes inaugurated in U.S. policy by the Carter administration
were a departure from the original precepts of the Monroe Doctrine inso-
far as those changes recognized divergent intra-continental interests not
always separate from the rest of the world as well as political diversity
within the hemisphere. But the new policy was not an abandonment of
the Doctrine in that it still contained the strains of, and in a sense was a
return to, the principles of 1823 insofar as the territorial and political
inviolability (i.e., the right of self-determination) of each American nation
was strongly reaffirmed. The President also made it clear in later remarks
that the United States was firmly committed to its obligations under the
Rio Treaty and the OAS Charter, and would work positively toward more
effective operation of the OAS and U.N. dispute-settling machinery.11 s In
this regard, therefore, the multilateralized Monroe Doctrine as formally
expressed in the Rio Treaty and the OAS Charter was once again
stripped of the interventionist corollaries which had been added to it
since World War II.
The disclosure in August 1979 of the existence of a Soviet combat
brigade in Cuba offered President Carter a chance to reassert the princi-
ple of hemispheric security against a tangible extra-continental threat.
Without raising the tattered banner of the Monroe Doctrine by name,
Secretary of State Cyrus Vance reacted to reports of the brigade by say-
ing that the presence of the Soviet troops in Cuba "runs counter to long-
held American policies." 1 ' While Mr. Vance was partly referring to the
"bilateral understandings" of 1962 and 1970 between the United States
and the Soviet Union,1 he was also responding to critics who viewed the
Soviet combat presence in Cuba as a direct violation of the Monroe
Doctrine. 1 '
Despite the opportunity to invoke the principles of 1823 against the
Soviet combat presence in Cuba, the President chose instead to dismiss
an in-depth critical analysis of Brzezinski's thesis and its adoption by the foreign policy
establishment of the Carter administration, see Kirkpatrick, supra note 103, at 39-41; Kirk-
patrick, U.S. Security & Latin America, COMMENTARY, Jan. 1981, at 30-33. For a short cri-
tique of both Kirkpatrick articles, see Wilde, Jeane Kirkpatrick: Utilitarianism as U.S.
Foreign Policy, 98 CHRISTIAN CENTURY 226 (1981).
' " See 14 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc. 1596, 1599 (Oct. 2, 1978); 14 WEEKLY COMP. OF
PRES. Doc. 1141, 1143 (June 26, 1978).
:1 N.Y. Times, Sept. 5, 1979, at 8, col. 3.
1" In a letter of July 27, 1978 to Senator Richard Stone of Florida, Vance stated that
"the essential understanding is [that] . . . the Soviets agreed in 1962 that offensive weapons
could not again be introduced in Cuba. In 1970, it was made clear that this understanding
included sea-based systems." N.Y. Times, Sept. 5, 1979, at 8, col. 2.
1 Upon learning of the Soviet troops in Cuba, Senator Stone stated that their pres-
ence "is a base, and our nation's policy for more than a century has been to oppose the
establishment of bases in this hemisphere by countries who don't belong here." N.Y. Times,
Sept. 1, 1979, at 3, col. 4.
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the troops as not being a viable threat to hemispheric security. In his
televised address of October 1, 1979, President Carter explained that the
Soviet combat brigade had been in Cuba for several years but did not
represent a direct threat to the United States. Nevertheless, the presence
of the brigade was "a serious matter" because it contributed to tensions
in the Caribbean and Central American region. " 7 The President went on
to explain that Cuba is completely dominated by the Soviet Union and
that "the Soviet brigade is a manifestation of Moscow's dominance of
Cuba." 18 By increasing surveillance and military capability in the region
President Carter pledged:
[W]e will assure that no Soviet unit in Cuba can be used as a combat
force to threaten the security of the United States or any other nation in
this hemisphere. Those nations can be confident that the United States
will act in response to a request for assistance to meet any such threat
from Soviet or Cuban forces. [Emphasis added].
This policy is consistent with our responsibilities as a member of the
[OAS] and a party to the Rio Treaty. It's a reaffirmation of John F. Ken-
nedy's declaration in 1963 'that we would not permit any troops from
Cuba to move off the island of Cuba in an offensive action against any
neighboring countries.'
Like his predecessors since President Kennedy, President Carter ap-
peared to accept the fact that Castro's Cuba was an accomplished and
continuing violation of the Monroe Doctrine, about which the United
States and the OAS could do very little. Aside from the more tangible
"threat" of Soviet domination of Cuba, however, Cuban activities in Cen-
tral America introduced a potentially more serious threat to the increas-
ingly fragile concept of hemispheric solidarity. In the late 1970's and early
1980's, events in Nicaragua and El Salvador revealed that while the prin-
ciples of 1823 may have remained theoretically intact under the Rio
Treaty and the Caracas Declaration, it was still the policy and percep-
tions of the United States which were determinative of the Monroe Doc-
trine's practical efficacy in hemispheric affairs.
The overthrow of the Somoza dictatorship in Nicaraugua by the Cu-
ban-supported Sandinistas in July 1979 was to many the successful im-
plant of "another Cuba" in the Western hemisphere by the Communist
bloc.120 To the Carter administration, the Sandinista takeover was noth-
ing more than the exercise by the Nicaraguan people of their inherent
M7 Peace and National Security: Address to the Nation on Soviet Combat Troops in
Cuba and the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty, Oct. 1, 1979, 15 WEEKLY CoMP. OF PRES.
Doc. 1802, 1803-04 (Oct. 8, 1979).
"1 Id. at 1804.
1 Id. at 1804-05.
,20 See N.Y. Times, July 20, 1979, at 4, col. 1; Kirkpatrick, supra note 103, at 36.
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right of self-determination. '21 On the one hand, the Monroe Doctrine was
being violated by Cuban-Soviet aid to the Nicaraguan Marxists, while on
the other hand the withdrawl of U.S. support for the Somoza government
because of human rights violations represented an effort to cleanse the
Doctrine of the unilateral interventionist trapping it had acquired since
World War 11.122 In any case, the fears of "another Cuba" seemed justi-
fied when the new government of Nicaragua, "a country whose location
gives it strategic importance out of proportion to its size or strength,"1 2
withdrew from the Central American Defense Council in August 1979,
calling the organization an "instrument of U.S. imperialism. 12 4 By the
end of the Carter administration's days in power, the cry of "no more
Cubas" had changed in many circles to "no more Nicaraguas. '1 2
E. Revival of the Doctrine: The Reagan Administration
As illustrated above, the Monroe Doctrine had not been completely
abandoned by the Carter administration, but it was in a state of consider-
able disrepair by 1981, particularly as an instrument of unilateral policy
by the United States. One of the first foreign policy moves by the Reagan
administration was to revive the principles of 1823 and to reassert their
primacy in U.S. policy toward Latin America. On a fundamental level and
in sharp contrast to the changed outlook of the 1970's, the Reagan Presi-
dency appeared to abandon the "globalist approach" of the Carter admin-
istration in favor of the traditional idea of a "special relationship" be-
tween the United States and Latin America.12 Based as it is on the old
doctrine of the two spheres and the perception that the United States is
primarily responsible for the security of the hemisphere, the Reagan ap-
proach worked an abrupt "relegitimization of the Monroe Doctrine, 1 2 7
both unilaterally and multilaterally.
El Salvador, the smallest and most densely populated nation in Cen-
tral America, became the focal point for the revival of the traditional ap-
proach toward Latin America as a whole. In October 1979, a military coup
had overthrown the repressive regime of General Carlos Humberto Ro-
121 N.Y. Times, July 26, 1979, at 1, col. 6, 3, col. 6; Kirkpatrick, supra note 103, at 36.
"I Kirkpatrick, supra note 103, at 41.
"23 Id. at 43.
1' N.Y. Times, Aug. 9, 1979, at 9, col. 1.
125 Wilde, supra note 112, at 228.
"2 See Kirkpatrick, supra note 112, at 40, who advocated such a change because the
Carter approach denied "the realities of culture, character, geography, economics, and his-
tory." Ms. Kirkpatrick's ideas, while not definitively authoritative as those of the Reagan
foreign policy establishment, have apparently been very influential, particularly with respect
to Latin America. See Nossiter, Mrs. Kirkpatrick Tackles U.N. Job With New Zest, N.Y.
Times, June 24, 1981, at 6, col. 4.
'" Buckley, supra note 3.
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mero and installed a military-civilian junta composed of a coalition of
"moderate" political and military elements.1 26 The junta, with the aid of
the United States, embarked on a program of economic and social reform,
but was opposed in such efforts by both the extreme left and extreme
right. As 1980 drew to a close, the situation became more chaotic as guer-
rilla warfare engulfed the country and U.S. aid was withdrawn. As it be-
came increasingly clear that .the Sandinista government of Nicaragua had
quietly aligned itself with Cuba and the Soviet Union, many feared that
the same fate (i.e. a-Communist takeover) lay in store for El Salvador.1 2'
Shortly before the inauguration of President Reagan, the leftist coalition
of Marxist guerrilla groups in El Salvador launched a "general offensive"
against the government, which failed but which prompted the new ad-
ministration to quickly search for a new policy to deal with the
situtation.130
What the Reagan administration chose to emphasize with regard to
the situation in El Salvador was reminiscent of the attitudes of the 1950's
concerning Guatemala and the Caracas Declaration. In February 1981,
the State Department reported that captured guerrilla documents re-
vealed that the Salvadoran rebels were being covertly supplied with arms,
munitions, and equipment through Cuba and Nicaragua from other Com-
munist countries, including the Soviet Union, Vietnam, East Germany
and Czechoslovakia.I"8 "In short," proclaimed the State Department,
"over the past years, the insurgency in El Salvador has been progressively
transformed into a textbook case of indirect armed aggression by Com-
munist powers through Cuba.""'s As a result, the United States increased
military aid to prevent "outside forces" from accomplishing "a Commu-
nist state takeover in El Salvador."1 8
Although the involvement of extra-continental Communist powers in
El Salvador was doubted or denied by some, 1" it is clear that the evi-
128 See Communist Interference in El Salvador, 81 DEP'T STATE BULL. 7 (Mar. 1981);
N.Y. Times, Feb. 20, 1981, at 4, col. 2; Kirkpatrick supra note 112, at 39.
129 Kirkpatrick, supra note 112, at 38-39.
ISO Shortly before President Carter left office, the United States resumed military aid to
the junta in response to reports of increased military aid to the Salvadoran guerrillas from
Nicaragua. N.Y. Times, Jan. 19, 1981, at 11, cols. 1, 5. Economic aid to Nicaragua was sus-
pended shortly thereafter. N.Y. Times, Jan. 23, 1981, at 3, col. 1. The failed offensive, how-
ever, revealed that the Marxist guerrillas in El Salvador did not enjoy the degree of popular
support that similar elements in Nicaragua had. As Robert E. White, former Ambassador to
El Salvador, put it, "They gave a war and nobody came." Arms Aid and Advisers: Debating
the New Policy on El Salvador, N.Y. Times, Mar. 8, 1981, § 4, at 2, col. 1.
20 N.Y. Times, Feb. 6, 1981, at 1, col. 3, 4, col. 2; N.Y. Times, Feb. 20, 1981, at 1, col. 1.
," Communist Interference in El Salvador, supra note 128, at 7.
1' N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1981, at 1, col. 2.
"' See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 1981, at 1, col. 5; Plain Dealer, Feb. 22, 1981, § A, at
1, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Feb. 27, 1981, at 4, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Mar. 5, 1981, § 1, at 1, col. 3.
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dence compiled and the response to that evidence by the United States
was an attempt to ressurrect nothing less than the Monroe Doctrine itself
via the Caracas Declaration. By branding the threat to El Salvador as
emanating from outside the hemisphere, "extending to this hemisphere
the political system of an extracontinental [sic] power," it could be easily
argued that "the sovereignty and political independence of the American
states was threatened, "endangering the peace of America."' 35 It could
also be argued that the Communist interference in El Salvador by Cuba
and the Soviet Union was a "fact or situation that might endanger the
peace of America" in violation of Article 6 of the Rio Treaty.'36 In these
respects, therefore, the Communist aid to the Salvadoran guerrillas vio-
lated the multilateralized Monroe Doctrine and would provide justifica-
tion for collective action by OAS member states. In the absence of collec-
tive action, of course, unilateral action by the United States was
mandated by the Doctrine when hemispheric security interests were at
stake.
The attitude and action taken by the United States in El Salvador
was done without the strong backing of some important OAS member
states. In Mexico, for example, President Jos6 L6pez Portillo felt that
U.S. military aid and the inordinate attention being paid to tiny El Salva-
dor had turned Central America and the Caribbean into "a zone of hege-
monic confrontation" between East and West, elevating the region "to
the undersirable category of a strategic frontier. 137 Indeed, that was pre-
cisely what U.S. policy-makers had intended. But, as certain statements
indicate, it was less a cold war "containment" of Communist expansion
policy than it was hemisperic protectionism based on the Monroe Doc-
trine. When asked in a March news conference about comparing U.S. in-
volvement in El Salvador with that in Vietnam, President Reagan made
an important and revealing distinction:
The situation here is, you might say, our front yard . . . it isn't just El
Salvador.
What we're doing in going to the aid of a government that asked
that aid of a neighboring country-and a friendly country in our hemi-
sphere-is try to halt the infiltration into the Americas, by terrorists and
by outside interference, and those who aren't just aiming at El Salvador
but . . . are aiming at the whole of Central and possibly later South
Caracas Declaration, supra note 61.
" Rio Treaty, supra note 48, art. 6. Presumably, it was the Rio Treaty and the Caracas
Declaration which Secretary of State Alexander Haig felt were being violated by the "illegal
Soviet interventionism in El Salvador." See 81, DEP'T STATE BULL. 1, 11 (May 1981). In
Secretary Haig's view, there has been "a fundamental -modification of the so-called
Brezhnev doctrine" by its extension beyond the Soviet Union's geographical periphery and
into the Western hemisphere. Id. at 11.
M N.Y. Times, Feb. 25, 1981, at 6, col. 1.
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America and ... eventually North America .... [WIhat we're doing is
trying to stop this destabilizing force of terrorism and guerrilla warfare
and revolution from being exported in here, backed by the Soviet Union
and Cuba and those others that we've named. 8
While the Reagan foreign policy in many areas is still in its incuba-
tion stages, it could not be clearer with regard to Latin America. It has
abandoned the emphasis on human rights in Latin America in favor of
hemispheric security.1 89 Perhaps most importantly, it appears to have
abandoned the "globalist approach" in favor of the doctrine of the two
spheres, as pointed out above. In short, the Monroe Doctrine is once
again in vogue in United States foreign policy.
III. CONCLUSION
The Monroe Doctrine in the 1980's, as it has been in every decade
since its pronouncement in 1823, is a product of geography and historical
perceptions. Its vitality in any given period is, as we have seen, largely
shaped by the attitudes and actions of U.S. Presidents and policy-makers.
Though it dare not be mentioned by name in inter-American diplomacy,
lest the ghosts of its corollaries be raised, the Monroe Doctrine as a prin-
ciple in inter-American relations is not an anachronism in the 1980's. It
would be naive to think that the United States has forever precluded it-
self from unilateral intervention when its hemispheric security interests
are at stake. If and when the United States ever acts unilaterally against
an American state to eliminate what is perceived to be an extra-continen-
tal threat, it would be by definition a manifestation of the Monroe Doc-
trine. By the same token, the Doctrine's multilateral aspect will survive as
long as there remains a distinct and viable body of regional international
law in the inter-American system.1 4 0
The lawyer involved in inter-American relations must of necessity
understand the complex relationship of principles of 1823 to modern
hemispheric affairs. It is apparent from the long and tortured history of
the Doctrine that its status has depended largely on the actions of the
United States and U.S. policy-makers' pronounced justifications for those
actions. As Professors Franck and Weisband have warned, the lawyer
must be careful not to make "the common jurisprudential error of confus-
ing what the law is with what it ought to be. For evidence of what the law
'18 The President's News Conference of March 6, 1981, 17 WEEKLY COMp. PREs. Docs.
245 (Mar. 9, 1981).
'39 See, e.g., U.S. Moves to Improve Ties to Latin Military Regimes, N.Y. Times, Mar.
8, 1981, § 1, at 8, col. 5; Repression Increased in Guatemala As U.S. Tries to Improve
Relations, N.Y. Times, May 3,1981, § 1, at 1, col. 2.
"140 See generally Note, International Law in Latin America, 7 LAw. AM. 605 (1975).
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is, the lawyer must examine the actual practice of nations, which consists,
first, of what states do and, second, of their exegetic endeavors to give
conceptual definition to their acts."' The Monroe Doctrine in the 1980's
will be shaped as it has since 1823: by the actual practice of nations in the
Western Hemisphere, particularly the United States. Thus the lawyer's
responsibility vis-a-vis the Doctrine of Monroe is to assure that its invo-
cation in actual practice conforms more closely to the principles as they
were intended in 1823.
.. Franck & Weisband, supra note 96, at 979.

